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Privacy of Students and
Confidentiality of Student Records
Lawrence R. Caruso
JTHIS ARTICLE discusses the privacy of students and the legality
W and confidentiality of student files and records. It is essentially
limited to the legal aspects of these problems.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that privacy and confiden-
tiality are not the same thing
THE AutMoR: LAw ENE R. CA~oso legally. It is possible, of course,
(A.B., LL.B., LLM., George Washing- that in a single case a university
ton University; M.A., Rutgers Univer- could be charged with both an
sity) is the Legal Counsel and Assistant
Secretary, Princeton University, and Past invasion of privacy and a viola-
President, National Association of Col- tion of confidentiality arising
lege and University Attorneys. out of a single incident. In
order to advise a college* con-
cerning the legal pitfalls, however, it is best that the two concepts be
examined separately, even though they probably will be intertwined
when a practical problem arises.
Privacy is a much more recent legal concept than confidentiality.
The right of privacy is the right of a person to withhold himself
and his property from public scrutiny if he so chooses.' It is said
to exist only so far as its assertion is consistent with law or public
policy. In a proper case, courts of equity will interfere by way of
injunction to prevent an injury threatened by the invasion of, or in-
fringement upon, the right of privacy when that injury is spurred by
motives of curiosity, gain, or malice.
The recognition and development of the "right of privacy" is
perhaps the most dramatic illustration of the influence of legal peri-
odicals upon the courts. Before 1890 no English or American court
had ever granted relief expressly based upon the invasion of such a
right, although there were cases which in retrospect seem to have
been groping in that direction, and at least one judge had used the
phrase, "the right to be let alone."2 In 1890 Samuel D. Warren and
* The words "college" and "university" are used herein interchangeably, without
distinction.
ISee Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
2y. SMITH & W. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1152 (2d ed.
1957).
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Louis D. Brandeis published their famous article, The Right of Pri-
vacy,' which reviewed a number of older cases involving the publi-
cation of letters, portraits, and the like, in which relief had been
afforded on the basis of defamation, breach of confidence, or breach
of an implied contract. The article concluded that these cases were
in reality founded upon a broader principle which was entitled to
separate recognition. This principle was stated to be the right of a
private individual to be let alone and to be protected from unau-
thorized publicity in his essentially private affairs.4
Subsequent writers generally advocated the existence of the right
of privacy and the tort of invasion of privacyY The courts of
New York were the first to consider the doctrine advanced by War-
ren and Brandeis.6 The courts of Georgia, however, were the first
to recognize the right of privacy by name,7 and today many states
give recognition to such a right.
How, then, does this affect a university in its dealings with a
student? The right of privacy does not exist because of any particu-
lar relationship. It is a right which every person has. A student, in
this connection, is no different from any other person; he has a right
of privacy which the law will protect from invasion. A university,
therefore, may not pry unnecessarily into the personal affairs of its
students. It may not reveal to others information concerning its
students, unless it has a proper basis for doing so.
As a practical matter, what should a university do or not do to
avoid violating a student's right of privacy? In my view, the law
permits a university to make inquiry concerning a student, to seek
information from him, and, under proper circumstances, to observe
him, as long as the information sought has some logical and rea-
sonably substantial relevance to the educational and other purposes
of the university. Furthermore, since the right of privacy belongs
to the person, he may, in effect, "release" so much of it as he chooses.
Consequently, a university might request a fairly significant amount
of personal information from a student and subsequently reveal that
information to others, provided that the student has given his per-
mission for such a revalation. Even though most college under-
3 Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rzv. 193 (1890).
4Id. at 213.
5 See, e.g., Ragland, The Right of Privacy, 17 KY. L.J. 85 (1929).
6 E.g., Schwyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1891), afI'd, 19
N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. Gen. Term 1892), af'd mnem., 77 N.Y. 598 (Sup. Ct. June Term
1893), rev'd, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895).
7 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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graduate students have not attained their majority, I believe most
courts would hold as a matter of law that they are sufficiently ma-
ture to grant this permission. This can be particularly important in
such matters as requests for information from prospective employers,
graduate schools, and the like. Consequently, any university form
requesting information from students which subequently might be
revealed to others should contain both a prominent statement to
that effect and a statement at the end whereby the student gives his
permission for such use of the information. The latter statement
should be followed by the student's signature.
The law quite dearly provides that when a person gives up his
right of privacy for some purposes, he does not necessarily give it up
for all purposes.8 Therefore, if a student provides his university
with certain requested information and signs the kind of form sug-
gested above, the university should be careful not to extrapolate
from this an assumption that the student has given up his right of
privacy in toto. Even though a university may have such a statement
from a student in its files, that statement does not give the university
a legal right to pry unnecessarily into the student's affairs or to re-
veal unauthorized private information to others.
There are but a few reported court decisions involving colleges
and the right of privacy. And those decisions which do exist usu-
ally involve the college suing an outside organization for violation
of the college's own right of privacy - as in the famous Vassar Col-
lege case of more than half a century ago9 and the more recent
Notre Dame ("John Goldfarb") case10 - rather than the kind of
problem discussed here. One very recent case, however, is in point.
A group of students at a state-supported institution of higher educa-
tion sued their institution, challenging its rules requiring most stu-
8 See, e.g., Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1942) where the court said, 'The plaintiff's position as an actress and concert
singer might have afforded justification for some sorts of publicity regarding her greater
than that to which persons not so engaged must submit, but it in no wise justified the
acts done by the defendant here." Id. at 211, 127 P.2d at 580.
9Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1912). The
court held that Vassar College had no right of privacy that it could preserve by injunc-
tion.
10 University of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 44 Misc.
2d 808, 255 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d
301, a'd mem., 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965). One of
the unsuccessful claims of Notre Dame in this case was that the motion picture film
"John Goldfarb, Please Come Home" invaded the University's right of privacy in viola-
tion of a 1961 New York statute. See 29 ALBANY L Ruv. 365 (1965); 56 CoLum.
L REV. 1124 (1965); 79 HARV. L REv. 863 (1966); 40 NoTRE DAmE LA w. 330
(1965).
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dents to live and eat on campus. The students alleged, among other
things, that their rights of privacy were violated by the "communal"
living arrangements. A three-judge United States district court held
that the students' rights of privacy are not invaded by "communal"
living conditions as long as the institution guarantees them freedom
from unwarranted searches and intrusions." The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the district court's decision without opinion.12
A serious problem area is the matter of student discipline. Any
information contained in files on student discipline which is a mat-
ter of public record, such as arrests and convictions, may be revealed
to others. Even here, however, a university should be careful to
reveal such information only for a legitimate purpose.'" When, on
the other hand, a university reveals details of its own disciplining of
a student, the student might initiate a legal action, charging invasion
of his privacy.' 4 In my opinion, most of these claims would not
succeed. My reason for this belief is the fact that the student would
not initiate his action when the university learned of his activities
that led to the disciplinary action, but rather when it revealed
those activities to others, perhaps many years later. In my view, if
there was no invasion of the student's privacy when the university
became aware of the information in question (and I will assume,
arguendo, that there was no such invasion because what usually
would be involved would be an infraction of the university's rules,
which manifestly is a matter about which the university is compe-
tent to inquire' 5), I believe that the revelation of such information
to others does not create any legal offense by way of invasion of
privacy. That is to say, if the privacy was not invaded by the gath-
ering of the information, it probably is not invaded by the revela-
tion of the information for a legitimate purpose.'8 This, however,
11 Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872, 883 (W.D. La. 1970),
afi'd mem., 39 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. April 5, 1971).
12 Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 39 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. April 5, 1971).
'3 Cf., e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 P. 91, 93 (Dist. Ct. App.
1931), where the court said: "We believe that the publication by respondents of the
unsavory incidents in the past life of appellant after she had reformed . . . was not jus-
tified ... and was a direct invasion of her [right of privacy) . This was so even
though the incidents revealed were a matter of public record.
14 It is always possible, of course, that a single incident may both give rise to a uni-
versity disciplinary action and become a matter of public record. See, e.g., United
States v. Wefers, 314 F. Supp. 137 (D.N.H. 1970).
15 Cf. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
16 This is not to deny that there may be circumstances where one does not invade
another's privacy in acquiring certain information about him, but would invade his pri-
vacy if that information subsequently were revealed to others. But in my opinion the
circumstances described in the text do not fall into this category.
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relates only to charges of invasion of privacy. When we discuss the
question of confidentiality below we will examine this factual situa-
tion again.
Apart from a right of privacy, a student could possibly claim a
right of confidentiality as a basis for prohibiting unauthorized dis-
closures of his files and records to third parties. In contrast to the
right of privacy, which accrues to every person, the right of confi-
dentiality arises from some legally recognized relationship. Thus,
the university might arguably be under a legal duty to not disclose
information received in confidence from a student.' Courts have
not as yet recognized such a right between the university and the
student; but the right of confidentiality, although older than the
right of privacy, is still in its nascent stages. At present the only
confidential communications for which tort law provides protection
are those involving trade secrets' " and those between physician and
patient.19
Whether a duty of confidentiality should be imposed upon the
university may well be decided through an analysis similar to that
now employed in the physician-patient area. In the latter area, courts
did not have to break new ground in fashioning principles upon
which to bottom a duty of confidentiality. Rather, they simply
adopted the canons underlying the evidentiary privilege between
physician and patient in regard to the exclusion of testimony in a
judicial proceeding.20 These canons may be stated in terms of four
general conditions which must be satisfied before the evidentiary
privilege is recognized, 2 or, with respect to tort law, before a duty
17 See Meigs, The Confidential Nature of Students Records, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF
Trt ANNuAiL CoNF. OF THE NATL AssN OF COLLEGE AND UNiv. Ai's. S 14
(1962).
I8 See 2 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES
§ 51, at 344-46 (3d ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b), comment j at 13
(1939).
1 9 For examples of cases which, in their holdings or dicta, have recognized a tort ac-
tion for breach of the confidential physician-patient relationship, see Hague v. Williams,
37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 273 N.Y.S.2d
288 (Sup. C. 1966); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct.
1960); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958); Smith v. Driscoll, 94
Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917). Contra, Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (D.
Ga. 1957); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965).
2 0 See Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962). For a discussion
of this privilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Generally, the physician-patient privilege bars a doctor from testifying in court about
information secured by him during his examination and treatment of the patient. The
privilege was not recognized at common law, and thus it exists in America only by
virtue of statute. Today over two-thirds of the states have such a statute. Id. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22 to 2A:84A-22.7 (1970).
21 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527.
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of confidentiality is imposed: First, does the communication origi-
nate in confidence? Second, is the element of confidentiality essen-
tial to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship
between the parties? Third, is the relationship one that must be
fostered? Fourth, is the injury to the relationship caused by dis-
closure greater than any benefits which may be gained from that
disclosure?
If reasonable grounds can be mustered to support an affirmative
response to each of the above regarding the student-university
relationship, then perhaps a university could be legally bound not to
reveal any information received in confidence from a student. Such
a duty, however, need not be absolute. Exceptions have been made
to the physician's duty not to make unauthorized disclosures. In
certain instances doctors have been found legally justified in disclos-
ing confidential information. The test distilled from the cases is
whether there is an overriding public or private interest to justify
such disclosure." There is no reason why this defense could not be
available in the student-university situation. A university would
then be immune from liability where it proves an overriding interest
in favor of disclosure. An example of such an interest might be
security investigations made by the federal government. It would
be necessary, however, for a university to be extremely careful in this
kind of situation. The university would have to assure itself of the
identity of the person requesting the information. It would also
have to assure itself that the information requested could serve an
overriding legitimate purpose, and it would have to be careful not
to reveal any information beyond that which is requested and may
be necessary. In some situations, however, a university can obviate
any problems arising from a duty of confidentiality by making it
clear to the student before he gives the information to the univer-
sity that the university intends to receive it in a nonconfidential man-
ner, and that the student should not give the information to the uni-
versity unless he intends that its disclosure to the university be non-
confidential. In such a situation there should be something in the
university's files clearly to indicate that the student so intended.
A rather difficult problem, of course, is presented by student dis-
2 2 See, e.g., Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962) (public in-
terest in just and honest result justifies disclosure of infant patient's pathological heart
condition to insurer to whom the parents applied for life insurance on infant); Simon-
sen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (physician justified in disclosing
the dangerous and contagious nature of patient's condition to prevent the spread of
disease).
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cipline, where the consent procedure probably would not be work-
able and where information secured very probably is intended to be
in confidence.23 In my opinion, such information in the student's
records is legally protected against disclosure by the university be-
cause it is confidential information, even though, as I stated above,
to reveal it may not be an invasion of privacy. As a practical matter,
the university should refuse (absent a court order) to divulge any
confidential information in a student's record without the express
consent of the student involved. The student may give this consent
at any time. Thus, if confidential information is requested from a
university concerning events that occurred long before the request,
the university may still at that time secure the consent of the student
(or the former student) involved.
A rather different facet of the problem concerns information
about a student received from a nonstudent who may desire that such
information be kept confidential from third parties - and especially
from the student himself. Letters of recommendation are the best
example of such information. The files relating to the student
belong to the institution, not to the student. Thus, the student has
no right of general review of his files. Therefore, the choice lies
with the institution as to whether or not it will allow the student to
review his own file, and, if so, whether it will remove certain material
before he is allowed to review the file. In any event, persons who
are asked to write letters of recommendation, or similar material,
should be dearly informed whether or not their letters will be kept
confidential from the student. If they are to be confidential, the
college must scrupulously keep them so.
A special problem is presented by the reporting of changes in
draft status. If a draft registrant seeks deferment on the grounds
that he is a student, it is his responsibility to provide his local draft
board with proof of his college enrollment. The college is under no
23 For example, a student charged with an infraction of the rules is often called into
the Dean's office for an initial conference. In the past, such a meeting might have dis-
posed of the entire matter, and any information given by the student about himself or
others could have been kept in confidence. Today this is no longer the case. With a pos-
sible trend toward "open" disciplinary hearings, it may be that less of this information
will be confidential in the future. See French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338-39
(E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
941 (1970). See also RIEPORT OF THE ABA COMM'N ON CAMPUS GOV'T AND STU-
DENT DISSENT 25 (Feb. 1970). This report, in its entirety, should prove interesting
to all persons concerned with colleges and universities. The members of the commis-
sion that prepared the report were William T. Gossett (Chairman), Morris B. Abram,
Mary I. Bunting, Lawrence R. Caruso, Ramsey Clark, Samuel Dash, Theodore M. Hes-
burgh, Edward H. Levi, Glen A. Lloyd, John A. Long, Bayless A. Manning, Jerome J.
Shestack, Richard E. Wiley, Logan Wilson, and the late Whitney M. Young, Jr.
1971]
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obligation to supply information about the student's academic stand-
ing. Most colleges, however, willingly do so because it helps the
student to establish a basis for deferment. The problem arises when
there is a change in the student's academic standing. Many students
claim that the college may not report such changes in academic stand-
ing to the draft board, and that if the college does so it has breached
a confidential relationship. It is known that colleges in at least 11
states have failed to report such changes to the draft boards.24
In my opinion, not only is the reporting of changes in academic
standing to the draft boards not a breach of a confidential relation-
ship, but the college has a legal obligation to so report. Initially,
the college reports the student's academic standing to the draft board
at the student's own request for the purpose of securing a deferment
for him. This report is accomplished by the completion of Govern-
ment Form 109 by the college. The instructions accompanying that
form require the college to report to the draft board "when a stu-
dent is no longer enrolled, is not eligible to continue, or has gradu-
ated." Thus, the college voluntarily takes on - at the student's re-
quest - an obligation to report changes in his academic standing.
It is stated above that the files relating to the student belong to
the institution, not to the student. That is my opinion, and I believe
it is the majority view. Nevertheless, there are some who hold to
the contrary. For example, I understand from the press that early
in 1970 Goddard College, in Plainfield, Vermont, refused to disclose
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation requested information con-
cerning two of its current students and one former student. God-
dard College is reported to have held that a student's records belong
to the student and are merely held in custody for him by the insti-
tution.25 I do not agree with that conclusion in the usual situations.
There is nothing, however, to prevent a college and a student from
voluntarily agreeing to such an arrangement, and in that case God-
dard's position would be correct. Even then, however, the records
would be subject to subpoena.
There are certain parts of a student's record that, in my opinion,
never need to be treated as confidential. These would include the
fact that the student has attended the university; the dates of his
attendance; whether or not he received a degree, and, if so, the de-
gree or degrees he received and the dates when they were conferred.
On the other hand, details of his academic record, and certainly de-
245 Chronicle of Higher Education No. 15, at 2 (January 18, 1971).
2 5 Akron (Ohio) Beacon J., (Parade Magazine Supp.) Feb. 22, 1971, at 18, col. 2.
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tails of any disciplinary actions, are normally to be treated as legally
confidential.
This is but a rather sketchy review of some of the legal aspects
of the privacy of students and the confidentiality of student records,
but it is hoped that it will be of some practical value to attorneys
representing colleges and universities faced with these problems.
This is particularly important today with the sharp increase in stu-
dent activism, in public and governmental concern about that activ-
ism, and in everyone's concern that his legal rights not be invaded.
APPENDIX
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In the last 80 years, scores of articles have been written on the
right of privacy. This brief bibliography, set forth in chronological
order, represents an effort to select a few of those articles which
might be of interest to college administrators.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
2. Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693
(1912).
3. Ragland, The Right of Privacy, 17 Ky. LJ. 85 (1929).
4. Moreland, The Right of Privacy To-Day, 19 KY. L.J. 101
(1931).
5. Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932).
6. Kacedan, The Right of Privacy, 12 BOSTON U.L. REV. 353
(1932).
7. Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liabil-
ity for Emotional Distress, 1938 WIs. L. REv. 426.
8. Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941).
9. Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 712 (1948).
10. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEM. PROB.
203 (1954).
11. Note, Torts - Right of Privacy - Application and Scope of
the Right, 33 N.D.L. REv. 104 (1957).
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12. Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L.
REV. 1 (1959).
13. Graney, Manner of Publication Determinative of Action for In-
vasion of Privacy, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 362 (1960).
14. Tort - Missouri - Invasion of Privacy - Oral Communica-
tions, 25 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1960).
15. Note, Offenses and Quasi Offenses - Right of Privacy - Du-
ration of Consent, 36 TUL. L. REv. 164 (1961).
16. Torts - Right of Privacy - Duration of Implied Consent, 8
WAYNE L. REV. 348 (1962).
17. Franklin, Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal
Limitations on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107
(1963).
18. Patterson, Privacy: A Summary of the Past and Present, 35
PA. B. ASS'N Q. 52 (1963).
19. Note, Right to be Let Alone, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 597 (1965).
20. Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Right of Privacy:
The Frank Compromise, 11 VILL. L. REV. 357 (1966).
21. Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Ac-
cessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
342 (1966).
22. Comment, Eavesdropping, Informers, and the Right of Privacy:
A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975 (1967).
23. Note, Right to Privacy: Social Interest and Legal Right, 51
MINN. L. REV. 531 (1967).
24. Pollak, Right to Be Let Alone, 38 PA. B. AsS'N Q. 399 (1967).
25. Comment, Unreasonable Private Searches and Seizures and the
Exclusionary Rule, 16 AM. U.L. REV. 403 (1967).
26. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
27. Slough, Privacy, Freedom and Responsibility, 16 KAN. L. REV.
323 (1968).
28. Comment, Dormitory Student's Fourth Amendment Right to
Privacy: Fact or Fiction?, 9 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 143 (1968).
29. Comment, Torts - Limitations on the Rights of Privacy -
Privilege to Report Matters of Public Interest, 21 S.C.L. REV.
92 (1968).
30. Caruso, Legal Aspects of Privacy and Confidentiality of Stu-
dent Files and Records, 4 COLLEGE COUNSEL 26 (1969).
31. Wallenstein, Marijuana Possession As an Aspect of the Right
of Privacy, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 59 (1969).
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32. Pipe, Privacy: Establishing Restrictions on Government Inquiry,
18 AM. U.L. REV. 516 (1969).
33. Armstrong, College Searches and Seizures: Privacy and Due
Process Problems on Campus, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 537 (1969).
34. Meldman, Centralized Information Systems and the Legal Right
to Privacy, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 335 (1969).
35. Caruso, Privacy and Confidentiality of Student Records - A
Legal View, 45 COLLEGE & U. 645 (1970).
36. Torts: Protection of Individual Privacy from Electronic Sur-
veillance, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 223 (1970).
37. Privacy and Political Freedom: Application of the Fourth
Amendment to "National Security" Investigations, 17 U.C.L.
A.L. REV. 1205 (1970).
38. Applicability of the "New" Fourth Amendment to Investiga-
tions by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerg-
ing Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L. REV.
785 (1970).
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